Objectives: This study assesses age-related differences in the weighting and integration of appearance and behavior cues to trustworthiness. The aim is to assess whether it becomes more difficult with age to detect a cheater in disguise. Method: Young and older adults invested real money in a repeated trust game with trustees who varied on facial expression (smiling, neutral, angry) and return rate (high, low). Trustees were also rated for trustworthiness pre-and post-trust game. Results: Young and older adults learned to disregard appearances to invest more in trustees providing high relative to low returns. Both groups also updated ratings of trustworthiness from pre-to post-trust game in the direction of behavior that was incongruent with appearance. Notably, young (but not older) adults updated ratings of smiling trustees with a high return rate (i.e., returned money on 8 of 10 investments) to reflect reduced trustworthiness in line with the 2 instances of cheating from those trustees. Discussion: The findings show that there are no age-related differences in the way that obvious cheating in disguise is punished with reduced trustworthiness ratings. However, older adults are less vigilant to more subtle cheating in disguise, or are more forgiving of transgressions perceived as minor.
When meeting someone for the first time we rapidly deduce trustworthiness from facial appearances, even though this can often be misleading (Todorov, Pakrashi, & Oosterhof, 2009) . A much better but more difficult way to gauge someone's trustworthiness is by cooperating with them repeatedly and taking note of whether they reciprocate (King-Casas et al., 2005) . It may be particularly adaptive to integrate incongruent appearance-behavior information when updating impressions. For example, young adults are more likely to remember someone with a trustworthy facial appearance and untrustworthy behavior (the "wolf in sheep's clothing" or "cheater in disguise") relative to someone with an untrustworthy face and untrustworthy behavior (the "wolf in wolf's clothing"; Suzuki & Suga, 2010) . It is arguably more important to recall the former given that one is more likely to have cooperated with them initially. Elaborative processing required to reconcile incongruent (e.g., trustworthy-looking cheater) relative to congruent (e.g., untrustworthy-looking cheater) social information may contribute to better recall of the former (Hess, 2014; Macrae, Bodenhausen, Schloerscheidt, & Milne, 1999) . Older adults, however, experience cognitive decline that limits their capacity for elaborative processing (Hess, 2014) . This may lead to difficulty recognizing a cheater in disguise and increased vulnerability to exploitation.
An alternative prediction comes from the finding of an age-related increase in morality-based impression change when negative behavioral information conflicts with initial impressions (Hess & Pullen, 1994) . Specifically, young adults adjust judgments in the direction of new behavioral information, regardless of the valence of that initial information. In contrast, older adults are more likely to change their impression in light of new negative rather than new positive information. Moreover, the tendency to adjust judgments in the direction of new and inconsistent negative information is greater for older relative to younger adults. Hess and Pullen (1994) suggest that negative behaviors are more diagnostic than positive behaviors when judging traits that relate to morality. They argue that both honest and dishonest people tell the truth, while only dishonest people lie, making the negative behavior of lying more diagnostic of trustworthiness. They also suggest that older adults might make better use of diagnostic information because of their greater social expertise. Overall, this leads to the prediction that untrustworthy behavior is more likely to lead to impression change than trustworthy behavior, particularly among older adults. In other words, older adults should be better than young adults at spotting a cheater in disguise.
A recent study found that both young and older adults initially base trust decisions on whether the structural features of a face appear trustworthy, but subsequently disregard facial appearance to base decisions on more reliable behavioral information (Suzuki, 2016) . Although this learning was quicker for young than older adults, a further study found no age-related difference in the ability to disregard unreliable facial appearances in favor of more reliable reputational information about trustworthiness (i.e., Bailey et al., 2016) . Suzuki (2016) also assessed subsequent memories for trustworthiness and found that older (but not younger) adults were more likely to recall trustworthy-looking relative to untrustworthy-looking people as trustworthy, regardless of their behavior. This reveals age-related difficulty in letting go of first impressions in favor of more reliable behavioral information. Suzuki (2016) suggests that this is consistent with age-related difficulty in learning-based adjustment (Mata, Josef, Samanez-Larkin, & Hertwig, 2011; SamanezLarkin & Knutson, 2015) . It might also reflect older adults' reliance on schemas to a greater extent than young adults (Mather & Johnson, 2003) , and their preserved automatic relative to deliberative cognitive processes (Peters, Hess, Västfjäll, & Auman, 2007) . However, Suzuki's (2016) paradigm may have limited the ability of older adults to learn from behavioral information since participants interacted with 16 trustees at a time and with each trustee only four times. Therefore, age-related declines in memory (Salthouse, 2003) and processing speed (Salthouse, 1996) , may have impeded older people's ability to use behavioral information when recalling trustworthiness.
Notably, Cassidy and Gutchess (2015) found that appearance-behavior congruity, rather than incongruity, was associated with enhanced memory and updating of judgments when appearance was manipulated via structural facial appearance. They suggest that this may be evident specifically when people believe that traits are fixed rather than variable (Plaks, Stroessner, Dweck, & Sherman, 2001; Webb et al., 2016) . Facial expressions are less stable indicators of trustworthiness given that a smile, for example, could be either genuine or deceptive, and given that expressions can readily change over short intervals of time . Trustworthiness manipulated via facial expression might therefore be more likely to elicit incongruity effects than trustworthiness manipulated via fixed structural features of the face. In the current study, young and older adults engaged in repeated economic trust games with trustees who displayed smiling, neutral, or angry expressions. While a smile indicates that someone is trustworthy and has a desire to cooperate, displays of anger signal that someone is untrustworthy and should be avoided . Trustees also shared 80% of the time (i.e., usually provided a return on investment), or were miserly 80% of the time (i.e., usually kept the participants' investments for themselves). We extended Suzuki's (2016) paradigm by increasing the number of trust game interactions and asking participants to interact with fewer trustees at any one time. The aim was to reduce the information processing demands for older adults to get a purer measure of their investment behavior independent of complex processing. Furthermore, we assessed impression change via ratings of trustworthiness pre-and post-trust game.
The specific aim of the current study was to examine whether enhanced encoding of a smiling cheater (i.e., a cheater in disguise) relative to an angry cheater is evident in older age. Consistent with Bailey and colleagues (2016) , and given the reduced cognitive complexity of our repeated trust game, we did not expect age-related differences in learning to rely on behavioral trustworthiness in the trust game. We also predicted that, post-trust game, both young and older adults would rate smiling trustees who rarely reciprocate as less trustworthy than angry trustees who rarely reciprocate. The extent to which the age groups might differ in this impression change was subject to two competing hypotheses. First, we expected that a reliance on elaborative processing to reconcile incongruent information would result in an age-related decline in impression change (i.e., relative to young adults, older adults should rate smiling cheaters as more trustworthy post-trust game). We further expected that if a smiling cheater is better encoded than an angry cheater based on the elaborative processing afforded incongruent information, angry trustees who often reciprocate (also incongruent information) would be rated as more trustworthy post-trust game than smiling trustees who often reciprocate. The alternative hypothesis was that greater reliance on social expertise and diagnostic information would result in greater impression change among older relative to young adults. That is, judgments should be adjusted in the direction of new and inconsistent negative information, and this should be more evident among older than young adults (i.e., relative to young adults, older adults should rate smiling cheaters as less trustworthy post-trust game).
Method

Participants
A total of 38 older adults (50% female) and 36 young adults (47% female) participated in the study. All older participants and 25 young participants were recruited through convenience sampling, were living independently and received $10 Australian reimbursement to cover their travel expenses. The remaining 11 young participants were recruited through the University and received course credit for participating. Data for two older participants were excluded as they self-reported a history of neurological conditions, or scored below 26 on the Mini-Mental State Examination (Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975) , which is suggestive of cognitive impairment. Additional data were excluded for one young and two older adults who commenced the trust game but did not finish it, as well as for one young adult who made the same investment on over 20 consecutive trials. Thus, the final sample included 34 older adults (M age = 73.14 years, SD = 5.97; range 65-89; 50% female) and 34 young adults (M age = 22.03 years, SD = 2.12, range 19-27; 44% female). The sample size is consistent with studies that have detected medium to large effects of age group on trust with greater than 80% power (i.e., Bailey et al., 2016; Suzuki, 2016) . As shown in Table 1 , older adults had fewer years of education and greater financial wellbeing than young adults, but did not differ in IQ, anxiety, or depression. All participants gave informed consent and the study was approved by the Australian Catholic University Human Research Ethics Committee. Following Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe's, (1995) trust game, the investor (i.e., the participant) and trustee started each investment interaction with $10 each. The investor could invest any proportion of their $10 (in whole dollars) with the trustee, and any money not invested was simply kept. Any amount that was invested was tripled by the experimenter and the trustee then "decided" whether to share by returning half of their overall holdings for that interaction to the investor (i.e., the participant). To encourage genuine responding, participants were paid for 0.175% of their earnings, and were advised before commencing that this would result in a payment between $0 and $8.40 Australian, depending on success in the task.
Materials and Procedure
Repeated trust game
Following Delgado, Frank, and Phelps (2005) , participants were asked to make their decisions as though they were genuinely investing with real-life trustees. Participants completed 240 investment interactions with 24 different trustees. The images portraying the trustees were taken from the FACES database (Ebner, Riediger, & Lindenberger, 2010) . To minimize the influence of working memory capacity, they completed this task in four blocks. Within each block, for each pair of smiling, neutral, and angry faces, one trustee behaved in a trustworthy manner and reciprocated 80% of the time, while the other behaved in an untrustworthy manner and reciprocated 20% of the time. Participants invested 10 times with each individual trustee. See Supplementary materials for full details of stimuli selection and task procedure.
Trustworthiness ratings
Prior to the commencement and immediately after each trust game block, participants rated, "How trustworthy is this person?" on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very trustworthy), for each trustee within that block.
Results
Trust Behavior: The Repeated Trust Game
This initial set of analyses tested the hypothesis that there would be no age group differences in learning to base investment decisions (i.e., trust) on trustee behavior rather than facial expression. Average investment amount was analyzed using a 2 × 5 × 2 × 3 mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA; Age [young, older] Note: Education is in years full-time; NART refers to National Adult Reading Test (Nelson, 1982) estimated full-scale IQ scores; Anxiety and Depression are indexed by the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) ; Financial well-being is rated on a 5-point scale from 1 (very poor) to 5 (very good). 
Age × Return rate
The Age × Return rate interaction was followed-up with tests of simple effects. As shown in Figure 1 , there were no simple effects of age for trustees with high, F(1, 66) = 0.94, p = .336, η p 2 = .01, or low return rates, F(1, 66) = 2.44, p = .123, η p 2 = .04. Further, more money was invested in trustees with high rather than low return rates by both older, F(1, 66) = 10.22, p = .002, η p 2 = .13, and young adults, F(1, 66) = 36.67, p < .001, η p 2 = .36. Thus, the Age × Return rate interaction was driven by the substantially larger simple effect of return rate for young relative to older participants. Subjective financial wellbeing, which was higher among older than young adults, did not correlate with average investments in trustees with high or low return rates in either age group (r ≤ .23, p ≥ .199).
Time × Return rate × Expression
The Time × Return rate × Expression interaction was followed up with two Time × Expression ANOVAs carried out separately for trustees with high and low return rates. For trustees with a low return rate (Figure 2a) For trustees with a high return rate (Figure 2b) 
Trust Beliefs: Trustworthiness Ratings
This second set of analyses tested the prediction that trustworthiness ratings for smiling trustees who rarely reciprocate would decrease more from pre-to post-trust game than for angry trustees who rarely reciprocate. The analyses also tested competing hypotheses relating to potential age group differences in this effect, as well as the validity of the face stimuli pre-trust game. To assess trustworthiness ratings from pre-to post-trust game, we conducted a 2 × 2 × 2 × 3 mixed ANOVA (Age [young, older] This revealed a four-way Age × Phase × Return rate × Expression interaction, F(2, 132) = 4.94, p = .009, η p 2 = .07. This interaction was followed up with separate Age × Phase × Expression mixed ANOVAs for each return rate.
For trustees with a low return rate (Figure 3a ), there were two-way interactions for Phase × Expression, F(1.83, 120.93) = 31.43, p < .001, η p 2 = .32, Age × Phase, F(1, 66) = 4.05, p = .048, η p 2 < .06, and Age × Expression, F(2, 132) = 3.84, p = .024, η p 2 < .06. There was no three-way interaction, F(2, 132) = 0.59, p = .556, η p 2 < .01. We followed up the Phase × Expression interaction with tests of simple effects. This revealed a simple effect of expression pre-trust game, F(2, 65) = 44.26, p < .001, η p 2 = .58, but not post-trust game, F(2, 65) = 2.95, p = .059, η p 2 = .08. In the pre-trust game phase, participants rated smiling faces as more trustworthy than neutral faces (p < .001), and neutral faces as more trustworthy than angry faces (p < .001). There were also simple effects of phase for smiling, F(1, 66) = 73.98, p < .001, η p 2 = .53, and neutral, F(1, 66) = 18.75, p < .001, η p 2 = .22, but not angry trustees, F(1, 66) = 0.38, p = .542, η p 2 < .01. From pre-to post-trust game, trustees who demonstrated a low return rate were rated as less trustworthy if they displayed a smiling or neutral (but not angry) expression. We did not follow up the Age × Phase and Age × Expression interactions because no age effects on trust beliefs averaged across phase or expression were predicted.
For trustees with a high return rate (Figure 3b) , there was an Age × Phase × Expression interaction, F(2, 132) = 6.13, p = .003, η p 2 = .09. We therefore conducted Phase × Expression ANOVAs separately for young and older adults. This resulted in Expression × Phase interactions, F ≥ 7.85, p ≤ .001, η p 2 ≥ .19, for both age groups. These revealed simple effects of expression pre-trust game, F ≥ 25.46, p < .001, η p 2 ≥ .61, with smiling rated as more trustworthy than neutral (p < .001), and neutral more trustworthy than angry (p < .018). There was a simple effect of expression post-trust game for older, F(2, 32) = 9.57, p = .001, η p 2 = .37, but not young adults, F(2, 32) = 0.19, p = .826, η p 2 = .01. At the post-trust game phase, older adults rated smiling and neutral as equally trustworthy (p = .967), but angry faces were rated as less trustworthy than both (p ≤ .003). For both age groups there were also simple effects of phase for trustees with neutral, F ≥ 6.82, p ≤ .013, η p 2 ≥ .17, and angry expressions, F ≥ 9.98, p ≤ .003, η p 2 ≥ .23, whereby ratings increased from pre-to post-trust game. There was a simple effect of phase for smiling trustees among young adults, F(1, 33) = 28.97, p < .001, η p 2 = .47, but not older adults,
07. Young adults' ratings of smiling trustees with a high return rate decreased from pre-to post-trust game, while older adults' ratings remained constant, and this updating of trust beliefs was greater for young than older adults, t(66) = 2.52, p = .014, d = .62.
Discussion
The aim of the present study was to assess whether young and older adults differ in the way they update impressions after interacting with a smiling cheater (i.e., a cheater in disguise). As expected, both age groups were able to disregard initial impressions based on facial expression to use more reliable behavioral information when making investment decisions in the trust game. Nevertheless, this differentiation of trustee behavior (i.e., high vs low returns) was greater for young than older adults (as in Bailey et al., 2016; Suzuki, 2016; Webb et al., 2016) , and this could not be attributed to age-related differences in financial wellbeing. Contrary to predictions, smiling cheaters were not subsequently rated as less trustworthy than angry cheaters. However, participants' trustworthiness ratings of trustees with smiles and neutral expressions decreased after these trustees cheated in the trust game (i.e., demonstrated a low return rate), whereas ratings for trustees with angry expressions who cheated were not updated. Interestingly, young (but not older) adults' trustworthiness ratings of smiling trustees decreased after they demonstrated a high return rate. It appears that young adults updated their impressions of these trustees based on the two instances of cheating (i.e., trustees with a high return rate cheated in 2 out of 10 games). There was no corresponding decline in young adults' ratings of the trustworthiness of trustees with neutral expressions who demonstrated a high return rate, but who also occasionally cheated. This suggests that for young but not older adults, minor transgressions elicit punishment, particularly when they are accompanied by a smile.
We also tested whether an angry sharer (i.e., incongruent information) would be rated as more trustworthy than a smiling sharer (i.e., congruent information) after engaging in the trust game. Although this was not the case for either age group, both groups increased their trustworthiness ratings from pre-to post-trust game for neutral and angry (but not smiling) trustees with a high return rate. This finding reflects the reduction in trustworthiness ratings from pre-to post-trust game for trustees with smiling and neutral (but not angry) expressions who rarely provided a return. Together, these findings are suggestive of a degree of elaborative processing in the reconciliation of incongruent information, irrespective of age. That is, both age groups were more likely to update trust beliefs when behavior was incongruent relative to congruent with appearances.
Young adults lowered their ratings of trustworthiness after smiling sharers defected on 20% of investments. But neither age group increased their trustworthiness ratings based on the 20% of investments in which angry cheaters shared. This suggests that young adults' reduced trust in smiling sharers who cheated twice might not be attributable to elaborative processing involved in reconciling incongruent information (Macrae et al., 1999) . If elaborative processing of incongruent behavioral information was involved in the updating of this belief, we would have also expected to see updating of trust in angry cheaters who sometimes shared. The reduced trust in smiling sharers who occasionally cheated is instead consistent with past research showing that young adults remember a trustworthy-looking cheater better than an untrustworthy-looking cheater, but do not remember an untrustworthy-looking sharer better than a trustworthy-looking sharer (Suzuki & Suga, 2010) . It has been suggested that this indicates the existence of a specialized cheater detection mechanism (Suzuki & Suga, 2010) , and this mechanism may be more sensitive in young adults relative to older adults. This also signals increased vulnerability to deception with age, which is broadly consistent with studies showing that older adults are more trusting than young adults when confronted with a liar (Ruffman, Murray, Halberstadt, & Vater, 2012; Slessor, Phillips, Ruffman, Bailey, & Insch, 2014; Stanley & BlanchardFields, 2008) , and invest more than young adults in trustees who have reputations for not sharing . Although the age-related positivity effect (Reed, Chan, & Mikels, 2014) provides an explanation for why older adults may have attended less to the negative behavior, alternative (though tentative) interpretations are that older adults attended to these minor transgressions but were more forgiving of them (Bailey, Ruffman, & Rendell, 2013) , or attended to the transgressions and then forgot about them. Each of these possibilities should be examined in future research.
Violations of positive expectancies are better recalled than violations of negative expectancies (Suzuki & Suga, 2010) , particularly when information is diagnostic of morality (Hess & Pullen, 1994; Suzuki & Suga, 2010) . This could provide a further potential explanation for the finding that young adults rate smiling sharers as less trustworthy after they transgress 20% of the time (i.e., violate a positive expectancy), but do not adjust their ratings of angry cheaters who share 20% of the time (i.e., violate a negative expectancy). Furthermore, Bell, Giang, Mund, and Buchner (2013) found that only young adults (and not older) recall information that violates a positive expectancy better than information that violates a negative expectancy. This is consistent with the updating of only young (and not older) adults' beliefs about trustworthiness in the current study when positive (and not negative) expectancies were violated. The current study extends Bell and colleagues' finding specifically to violations in the form of minor transgressions. Taking the current data and Bell and colleagues' memory data together, it seems credible that older adults might have forgotten about the minor transgressions in the trust game when making their post-trust game ratings (Mutter & Asriel, 2016) . As noted, this is one possibility that requires further examination. We did not replicate Hess and Pullen's (1994) finding that older adults make better use of morality trait-diagnostic information. But, with greater life experience and well-developed social expertise (Hess, 2006) , minor transgressions might be less unexpected by older adults. It is also of note that the findings in Hess and Pullen were contingent on explicit violations wherein a new behavior contradicts a past behavior. In contrast, when there were minor transgressions, a new behavior contradicted both explicit behavioral and implicit appearance-based impressions in the current study.
As anticipated, trustworthiness judgments in the current study did not indicate a confirmation bias whereby congruent information confirms pre-existing beliefs and confers a learning bonus (as in Cassidy & Gutchess, 2015; Webb et al., 2016) . That is, participants were not more likely to increase trustworthiness ratings for trustees who mostly shared while displaying smiling relative to angry or neutral expressions, nor to decrease trust in trustees who cheated while displaying angry relative to smiling or neutral expressions. The lack of a confirmation bias could feasibly be related to the two instances of defection from each smiling sharer, and the two instances of sharing from each angry defector, making the information less congruent overall. But this explanation would not be consistent with the asymmetry that was found in young (but not older) adults' sensitivity to cheating in smiling sharers but not to sharing in angry defectors. A better explanation for the lack of congruency effects in the current study may be that, as suggested by Cassidy and Gutchess (2015) , confirmation biases may only occur when there is a belief that traits are fixed, unlike beliefs about trustworthiness that are initially derived from facial expressions (Plaks et al., 2001) .
It might be argued that the current study lacked ecological validity given that participants imagined interacting with each trustee rather than experiencing real-life interactions. However, the current trust game findings are entirely consistent with Campellone and Kring's (2013) study in which young adults believed they were interacting with real trustees. It will be important for replications of the current study to assess memory in order to disentangle whether older adults pay less attention to instances of cheating in disguise, attend to but forget the cheating, or are simply more forgiving than their younger counterparts. Future studies could consider including independent tests of the age-related positivity effect to assess whether an attentional bias toward positive information and/ or away from negative information (Reed et al., 2014) correlates with impressions of trustworthy individuals who occasionally transgress. Tests of executive function could also be used to directly measure the contribution of this higher order cognitive capacity to the positivity effect, facial recognition, and ultimately, trust. Lastly, future studies should ask participants how often they expect trustees to share or defect in order to test whether age differences in responding to violations of expectancies are explained by pre-existing differences in expectations.
The current study provides new evidence that older adults' beliefs about trustworthiness are as sensitive as young adults' after interacting with a smiling cheater (i.e., a cheater in disguise), at least when the cheating is prominent. Older adults are therefore efficient in recognizing that a smiling trustee who cheats most of the time may not be as trustworthy as first thought. However, they are less harsh than young adults in their judgment of a smiling trustee who cheats only occasionally. This effect of age may result from changes in attention or memory that lead to negative information being disregarded, or from enhanced social understanding and leniency in the face of minor transgressions. Regardless of the underlying mechanism, the study contributes to growing evidence for heightened vulnerability to deception as we grow older, particularly in response to subtle violations of positive expectancies.
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